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of Ralph Waldo Emerson
Ralph Waldo Emerson did not leave behind himself a consistent philosophical 
system. His contribution to American, and not only American, philosophy and 
literature is of different nature. Irwin Edman (1951: v) in his introduction to 
Emerson’s Essays writes that he does not read Emerson professionally. “For 
disclosures of the nature and signature of things,” he says, “I prefer, on the 
whole, more explicit, more literal, and more analytic thinkers.” Emerson indeed 
is neither explicit nor analytic, which is one of the reasons why he enjoys the 
reputation of a difficult philosopher. Still Edman (1951: v) admits that he does 
read Emerson, and he reads him because Emerson is “the thoughtful writer of 
prose which has, without any of the more patent devices of verse, the magical 
effects of poetry.”
In certain respects, Emerson is a complete failure as a philosopher. This 
is the result of his open hostility towards systematic thinking. Emerson’s aunt 
is recorded to have said that no Emerson “is capable of deep investigation or 
of long continued thought,” which some consider “the profoundest comment 
on her nephew” (Buell 1975: 45).
A good illustration of Emerson’s failure as a systematic thinker is his 
introduction to Nature. In his introduction Emerson (2006: I 5-6) sets out to 
clarify the basic terms employed in the treatise, most importantly the very 
term nature, which, as we all know, is capable of having manifold meanings. 
The most interesting passage is the last paragraph of the introduction, and it 
runs as follows:
Philosophically considered, the universe is composed of Nature and the Soul. 
Strictly speaking, therefore, all that is separate from us, all which Philosophy 
distinguishes as the NOT ME, that is, both nature and art, all other men and my 
own body, must be ranked under this name, NATURE. In enumerating the values 
of nature and casting up their sum, I shall use the word in both senses; - in its 
common and its philosophical import. In inquiries so general as our present one, 
the inaccuracy is not material; no confusion of thought will occur. Nature, in the 
common sense, refers to essences unchanged by man; space, the river, the leaf. Art 
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is applied to the mixture of his will with the same things, as in a house, a canal, 
a statue, a picture. But his operations taken together are so insignificant, a little 
chipping, baking, patching, and washing, that in an impression so grand as that of 
the world of the human mind, they do not vary the result.
Emerson’s definition of nature is strangely circular. Nature is nature plus art 
(“both nature and art [...] must be ranked under this name, NATURE”). This 
is quite confusing, even though Emerson explains that this is not the same 
nature. He speaks of nature in the philosophical (“the NOT ME”) and the 
common import (“essences unchanged by man”). And yet, for no apparent 
reason, graphically Emerson distinguishes at least three, and in some editions 
even four, different kinds of nature: there is Nature (with an initial capital), 
NATURE (in capitals), and (ordinary) nature. This is definitely more than is 
needed, especially that shortly afterwards he announces that anyway, he will 
use the word both in its philosophical and common sense. He claims that the 
difference between the two exists but it is so little that, in fact, it does not exist 
(“his [man’s] operations taken together are so insignificant, a little chipping, 
baking, patching, and washing, that in an impression so grand as that of the 
world of the human mind, they do not vary the result”). Thus the seemingly 
solved problem of the circularity of Emerson’s definition returns. His argument 
may be summarized as follows: Nature in the philosophical import equals 
nature in the common import plus art, but the art element is so insignificant that 
it can be, or even should be, disregarded, so Nature in the philosophical import 
equals nature in the common import. Or to put it even more concisely, Nature 
is nature. Such a definition is at best a tautology. Considering the fruits that it 
bore, Emerson’s great analytical effort seems to have been wasted.
In the passage quoted above Emerson attempts some other definitions of 
nature, which are even more baffling. The tricky thing about Emerson is that 
he introduces entirely new ideas in the disguise of a paraphrase. Thus what in 
the text is presented as merely an elaboration of the original definition is, in 
fact, an entirely new logical proposition, standing in a very dubious relation 
to the previous one.
First nature is defined in contradistinction to the Soul (“Philosophically 
considered, the universe is composed of Nature and the Soul”), from which it 
follows that Nature is the universe bereft of the spiritual element. Nature equals 
the Universe minus the Soul. Then, at the beginning of the very next sentence, 
Emerson defines nature in contradistinction to human beings (Nature is “all that 
is separate form us”), only to reject this definition in the second part of the same 
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sentence (“all other men [...] must be ranked under this name, NATURE”) 
and to define nature in contradistinction to the Self (“all which Philosophy 
distinguishes as the NOT ME”1). Emerson seems to be in two minds as far 
as other people are concerned. He cannot articulate his views clearly because 
his views are far from being clear.
1 This could be an echo of Fichte’s perplexing notion of the “Transcendental Ego.” Still Emerson 
seems to ignore the difference between the transcendental and the ordinary ego.
Emerson’s philosophy is haunted by the suspicion that man lives in the 
world of phantoms created by his own mind. In Nature he indicts solipsism in 
Chapter VII: “It leaves God out of me. It leaves me in the splendid labyrinth 
of my perceptions, to wander without end. Then the heart resists it, because it 
baulks the affections in denying substantive being to men and women” (2006: 
I 64). He struggles to transcend the duality between the soul and the world, the 
duality which he makes elsewhere the cornerstone of his philosophy. For he 
has proudly declared himself an idealist and
[ijdealism saith: matter is a phenomenon, not a substance. Idealism acquaints us 
with the total disparity between the evidence of our own being and the evidence 
of the world’s being. The one is perfect, the other, incapable of any assurance; the 
mind is a part of the nature of things; the world is a divine dream, from which we 
may presently wake to the glories and certainties of day. (2006:1 64)
His doubts seem to be gaining the upper hand in the essay entitled “Friendship,” 
where he declares:
I cannot deny it, O friend, that the vast shadow of the phenomenal includes thee 
also in its pied and painted immensity, - thee also, compared with whom all else is 
shadow. Thou art not Being, as Truth is, as Justice is, - thou art not my soul, but 
a picture and effigy of that. (2006: II 98)
And later he will add: “A friend therefore is a sort of paradox in nature. I who 
alone am, I who see nothing in nature whose existence I can affirm with equal 
evidence to my own, behold now the semblance of my being” (2006: II 205). 
Emerson (2006: III 61) is also the author of the saying: “Let us treat the men 
and women well: treat them as if they were real, perhaps they are,” which is 
probably the most succinct presentation of his views on this matter. Emerson is 
a philosopher who keeps his philosophy in the state of constant doubt.
That is why Emerson’s explanations usually do not explain anything, just 
the opposite, they only make the things more complicated. The introduction to 
Nature is a case in point. Emerson, as if realizing this, finally offers words of 
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comfort to his disturbed readers: “In inquires so general as our present one, the 
inaccuracy is not material; no confusion of thought will occur.” The weakness 
of this position is obvious; details do matter and should not be shoved aside 
that easily, just because they are inconvenient. But in his inability to explain, 
Emerson is similar to the Zen master from the following koan:
THE STUDENT Doko came to a Zen master, and said: “I am seeking the truth. In 
what state of mind should I train myself, so as to find it?”
Said the master, “There is no mind, so you cannot put it in any state. There is no 
truth, so you cannot train yourself for it.”
“If there is no mind to train, and no truth to find, why do you have these monks 
gather before you every day to study Zen and train themselves for this study?” 
“But I haven’t an inch of room here,” said the master, “so how could the monks 
gather? I have no tongue, so how could I call them together or teach them?”
“Oh, how can you lie like this?” asked Doko. “But if I have no tongue to talk to 
others, how can I lie to you?” asked the master. Then Doko said sadly, “I cannot 
follow you. I cannot understand you.”
“I cannot understand myself,” said the master. (“A Collection of Zen Koans”)
This affinity might run deeper. Both Zen and Emerson’s philosophy are ani­
mated by the spirit of rebellion; they are both iconoclastic. Even though Zen 
is commonly referred to as religion, it is a very unusual religious denomi­
nation as it rejects official creeds and religious dogmas. Considering this, it 
may actually be called an “anti-religion.” Similarly, Emerson’s philosophy 
may be described as an anti-philosophy. Emerson rejects the very principles 
of logical thinking.
The whole of Nature is actually a refutation of the definitions from the 
introduction. Emerson does present nature as something possessing spiritual 
characteristics. Nature is discussed as a source of Beauty, Language, and Disci­
pline. He further undermines the validity of the initial statement on the structure 
of the universe (“the universe is composed of Nature and the Soul”) by ques­
tioning the material existence of nature. As has been observed, his idealism 
verges upon solipsism. Emerson (2006: I 48) speculates that nature could be 
“the apocalypse of the mind,” or an image painted “in the firmament of the 
soul.” This would mean that man is not separate from nature but part of it (or 
that nature is part of him). In Chapter VII Emerson (2006: I 65) makes the 
following statement: “[Tjhat spirit, that is, Supreme Being, does not build up 
nature around us, but puts it forth through us, as the life of the tree puts forth 
new branches and leaves through the pores of the old.”
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Emerson rejects his analytical definitions for he finds them too restrain­
ing. He is much more himself when he announces in “History” that “nature 
is a mutable cloud which is always and never the same” (2006: II 14). He 
welcomes paradox and contradiction. In Nature Emerson makes a number of 
contradictory statements. He argues that nature is both the spirit and the matter, 
me and not me, me and other people, God and man, the object and the subject of 
perception, essences unchanged by man and essences changed by man. Nature 
is all this and much more; it is a great riddle. Solving this riddle would mean 
finding the answers to all important questions. Nature is the mysterious Over­
soul, in which all opposites are reconciled. It is unity underlying the seeming 
diversity of the created world. For differences exist only on the surface. This 
is what the juxtaposition of the contradictory definitions of nature might imply. 
Definitions feed on differences; if differences are only seeming differences, and 
the true reality is an all pervading oneness, then to differentiate and to define 
is a sheer waste of time. Everything is everything. If one analyzes, one refuses 
to acknowledge this spiritual truth.
Emerson never analyzes, he synthesizes. He does not want to divide but to 
unite. Ultimately, he wants to transcend all petty differences and distinctions, 
and reach the oneness of the ideal world, the real world.
One of the greatest paradoxes of Emerson’s philosophy is that this Platonic 
thinker inspired the philosophical tradition which is avowedly anti-Platonist 
and anti-metaphysical. And yet this is not an accident that such a philosopher 
as Frederick Nietzsche studied Emerson carefully and was deeply moved by 
his writing.2 It may be true that all texts deconstruct themselves but still there 
are texts that deconstruct themselves more than others do. Emerson’s essays 
belong to this category. Emerson’s aim is incommensurate with his method. 
His language runs counter to his argument.
2 For the account of Nietzsche’s studies of Emerson see Thomas H. Brojber Nietzsche’s Philo­
sophical Context. An Intellectual Biography (University of Illinois Press 2008), where Emerson 
opens the list of the major philosophical influences on Nietzsche’s thinking (22-25). For a more 
detailed comparison of the two philosophies see David Mikics’s The Romance of Individualism in 
Emerson and Nietzsche (Ohio University Press 2003)
The problem has been already identified by Charles Feidelson, Jr (1962: 
147),
What is extraordinary about Emerson’s writings is the way in which the problems he 
tried to ignore rose up again to dog him, lending a richer texture and content to his 
work. His flagrant inconsistency and the paradoxicality that he could never exclude 
from his theory were the product of his encounter with the making of literature and 
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with the claims of diversity upon every concrete fact. What is even more important 
is the seminal effect of his point of view, or the kind of thinking illustrated by it: 
the way his facile generalizations, which were intended as philosophical answers, 
communicated a new set of questions to the literary mind. While he spoke of the 
world as two only in order to suggest how it might be one, he thereby acknowledged 
a duality which is no less real because it is conquered in each instant of poetic speech.
The Emersonian cosmic vision of unity-in-diversity is also, at the same time, 
the vision of diversity-in-unity. Consider the following passage from Emer­
son’s journal,
The metamorphosis of Nature shows itself in nothing more than this that there is 
no word in our language that cannot become typical to us of Nature by giving it 
emphasis. The world is a Dancer; it is a Rosary; it is a Torrent; it is a Boat; a mist; 
a Spider’s Snare; it is what you will; and the metaphor will hold, & will give the 
imagination keen pleasure. Swifter than light the world converts into that thing you 
name. (I960: VIII 23; qtd. in Buell 1975: 170)
Feidelson (qtd. in Buell 1975:170) sees this passage as “a spontaneous dance of 
self-determining and autonomous symbols” that leads to “a literary anarchy.” 
Emerson abandons logical connectives, producing thus a volley of images. As 
Feidelson (1962: 151) notices, “The house of Rhetoric is built without logical 
mortar.” There is definitely more diversity than unity to this catalogue. The 
world is at the same time a dancer, rosary, torrent, boat, mist, and spider’s 
snare. As these images flash before our eyes, we cannot help but conclude that 
the world is constantly in the state of becoming. Nothing is stable, nothing 
is predetermined, everything changes. The world is a myriad of perceptions, 
and the truth, if there is such a thing as the truth, is bound to be subjective - it 
depends on the perceiver. The truth is what you will. The poet - the sayer creates 
the truth by creating metaphors. The truth is made rather than discovered; the 
world obediently converts into the thing the poet names, as if acknowledging 
the superiority of the poet’s will. I wouldn’t say that this is what the text 
implies; I’d say that this is what it explicitly states, even though it does not 
sound like Emerson the Metaphysician, or even Emerson the Idealist. It sounds 
very much like Nietzsche, the Prophet of Will and Becoming. Passages like this 
one, Nietzsche might have copied verbatim from Emerson.
Emerson is frequently caught arguing against his professed idealism. This 
is on the one hand due to a certain contradiction in his views, and on the other 
due to the language that he uses, and also his attitude towards language in 
general. Relativism is a corollary of subjectivity, which is in turn a corollary of 
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individualism. Thus it is small wonder than since Emerson argues for extreme 
individualism, sometimes he finds himself arguing for relativism, including 
moral relativism. In “Self-reliance” he declares, “’[I]f I am the devil’s child, 
I will live then from the devil.’ No law can be sacred to me but that of my nature. 
Good and bad are but names readily transferable to that or this; the only right is 
what is after my constitution; the only wrong what is against it” (2006: II 51). 
Emerson empowers the individual by giving him the right to decide what is right 
and wrong, and what is true and false. For Emerson the truth is not something 
that emerges in the process of logical argumentation. It is rather like a flash of the 
lightning. You see it, and you know. Hence in Nature he states, “Whenever a true 
theory appears, it will be its own evidence” (2006: I 5). A statement like this 
makes the whole philosophy and philosophizing redundant. We are reminded of 
Swift’s intelligent horses, who laughed when Gulliver tried to explain to them 
human systems of natural philosophy (1967: 315). When the truth is obvious, 
it is obvious, and there is no need to write about it. Emerson’s proposition will 
be echoed in Whitman’s poetry. The speaker of “Song of Myself’ will boldly 
state, “And what I assume you shall assume” (1955: 49).
Emerson always perceived himself more as a poet than a philosopher. In the 
letter to his future second wife Lydia Jackson, he writes, “I am bom a poet, of 
a low class without doubt, yet a poet. That is my nature & vocation” (2003: 24). 
As a poet, he believes that language is something more that a merely passive 
tool that one uses to describe what is and what is not. He empowers language 
along with the individual. The poet -.the sayer is capable of deciding what is 
true and what is false. He can do so as long as his metaphors influence people’s 
hearts. Thus truth appears to be a function of language. Obviously, this is not 
what Emerson explicitly says, but what he does say comes very close to it. 
The beginning of “Self-Reliance” is a very lucid presentation of the program 
of Emerson’s poetic philosophy:
I read the other day some verses written by an eminent painter which were original 
and not conventional. Always the soul hears an admonition in such lines, let the 
subject be what it may. The sentiment they instill is of more value than any thought 
they may contain. To believe your own thought, to believe that what is true for 
you in your private heart is true for all men, - that is genius. Speak your latent 
conviction and it shall be universal sense. (2006: II 46)
And this is why Emerson neither explains nor analyzes, but stuns and inspires. 
Emerson, a former preacher, appeals to his readers’ emotions rather than the 
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rational faculty. The strength of his argument lies in the strength of his images 
and metaphors.
It has been argued that Emerson’s style is a natural extension of his meta­
physical project. Emerson believes “that there is no fact in nature that does 
not carry the whole sense of nature,” that “the entire system of things gets 
represented in every particle” (Feidelson 1962: 151), and that all nature is a vis­
ible garment for the spiritual truth. Thus he validates his use of symbol and 
synecdoche. He also says that nature is “one thing and the other thing, in the 
same time,” justifying his reliance on metaphor (Feidelson 1962: 151). And 
since metaphor points to a secret similarity between two seemingly dissimilar 
objects, all these tropes may be viewed as means of reinforcing the message 
of the all pervading oneness. And yet at the same time they resist and subvert 
this message. Both metaphor and symbol tend to multiply the meanings, ap­
proaching dangerously the trope of irony. They always contain a certain surplus 
of meaning and suggest the inexpressible other, for which there is no room in 
the perfectly monistic system.
In this way Emerson comes very close to Nietzsche’s ideal discourse, the 
discourse which “seduces, tempts, forces, overturns.” This is, as Nietzsche 
(1998: 149) says, the discourse of “bom enemies of logic and straight lines, 
desirous of the foreign, the exotic, the monstrous, the crooked, and the self­
contradictory.”
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